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We study a model of mixed wholesale electricity market in which a profit-maximizing 
private generator and a public (or a regulated) generator compete to serve consumers 
on the same transmission network. We allow for different objective functions for the 
public/regulated generator, ranging from pure consumer surplus maximization to pure 
profit maximization. We consider a network configuration where transmission constraints 
may lead to network externalities. The transmission network is operated by an 
Independent System Operator (ISO) utilizing a market-based congestion management 
system. Reliability of the transmission network is achieved via explicit nodal 
transmission price signals to the generators. We characterize equilibria and study 
various issues involved, such as multiple equilibria and how to make a plausible choice 
among them based on (equilibrium) profits of the ISO and the public/regulated 
generator. We also study the impact of the public/regulated generator's objective 
function on equilibrium outcomes and overall welfare and characterize its optimal 
objective function. Our findings also have policy implications regarding the extent to 
which privatization of public generation assets should take place. 
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+ Corresponding author. 1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is to study a model of imperfectly competitive mixed 
wholesale electricity market in which a profit maximizing private generator and a public 
generator compete. We allow for different objective functions on the part of the public 
generator, ranging from pure consumers’ surplus maximization to pure profit 
maximization. This makes our analysis also applicable to electricity markets where a 
privately owned generator is subject to regulation, and is made to follow an objective 
function other than profit maximization when it competes with an unregulated private 
generator. Alternatively, one can think of a partially privatized public generator that 
follows an objective function reflecting the objectives of its public and private owners in 
proportion to their ownership shares. In that case, the partially privatized generator may 
be thought of as maximizing a weighted average of the consumers’ surplus (public 
owner’s objective) and the producers’ surplus (private owners’ objective). 
In many countries public ownership of vertically integrated franchise utilities had been 
the dominant structure of the electricity supply industry prior to the end of 1980's. Since 
then quite a few countries have witnessed a thorough restructuring in their electricity 
sectors. The U.K. being the prime example, a number of countries - Australia, New 
Zealand and Chile, to name a few - disintegrated their formerly vertically integrated 
franchise utilities, deregulated and opened to competition the generation and the retail 
segments, while keeping the natural monopoly network segments, i.e. the high-voltage 
transmission and distribution segments, either under public ownership or under strict 
regulation. Despite these developments, public ownership of generation assets and 
capacity is still the predominant type of ownership in many countries; and in many cases 
where it is not, public production is still significant in the wholesale generation segment. 
A policy challenge for public authorities in many countries is to what extent the public 
generating assets should be privatized and what the objective function of any remaining 
public generation companies should be. 
In Europe there are quite a few countries with "mixed" wholesale electricity markets in 
which public generators compete with their private counterparts: EdF in France, ENEL in 
Italy, Statkraft in Norway, Vattenfall in Sweden, Fortum in Findland, CEZ in Czech 
Republic, and ESB in Ireland are all state-owned companies. EnBW in Germany is 45% 
owned by EdF, the French state-owned company.  
The European Union's (EU) Directive 2003/54/EC aimed at ensuring a level playing 
field in generation markets and reducing the risk of market dominance through non-
discriminatory, transparent and fairly-priced access to transmission networks. It falls 
short of mandating structural unbundling of the transmission component from vertically 
integrated utilities but it requires legal separation and independent operation of 
transmission systems from generation and supply interests. This directive also orders 
non-discriminatory and cost-reflective balancing market tariffs until there is a liquid and 
competitive spot market for power. Finally, Directive 2003/54/EC requires harmonization 
of regulatory authorities of member states and lays down a minimum set of criteria and 
responsibilities they should satisfy. These criteria and responsibilities can be 
summarized as independence from electricity industry interests and ensuring non-
discrimination, effective competition and efficient functioning of the market within their 
respective countries. 
  1EU’s Regulation 1228/2003 of 2003, on the other hand, attempts to establish fair, 
cost-reflective, transparent and directly applicable rules for cross-border tarification and 
calculation and allocation of available interconnection capacities. In its current 
configuration, and to a greater extent in the European single market scenario, a public 
company is going to be acting like a public firm in its own country but like a private firm 
in the markets of other countries. Therefore, even markets that are currently totally 
dominated by a public firm, like France, will become mixed oligopolies. 
In fact, state-owned electricity companies, all of which are involved in electricity 
generation, seem to be flourishing in the new cross-national electricity markets of 
Europe. The Nordic electricity market, linking Norway, Sweden, and Finland is 
dominated by Vattenfall, Fortum/IVO and Statkraft. The most rapidly expanding 
multinational in Europe is EdF. EdF, a 100 percent state owned company, has activities 
not only in West European countries, but in Central and Eastern Europe, North America, 
Latin America, Asia, and Africa. In most of these markets publicly owned companies 
compete with privately owned companies.
1
Among the top fourteen European electricity companies ordered by the size of 
electricity sales in 2004, six were state-owned (or the state owns a controlling majority), 
with EdF and ENEL being the first and the second, respectively.
2
Even in the United States, known as the stronghold of the investor-owned utility 
model, there is a non-negligible ownership of capacity by the public authorities. As of 
year-end 2004 publicly owned utilities, federal power agencies and cooperatives 
collectively had 20.7% of the total U.S. nameplate capacity and 22.2% of the total U.S. 
electricity generation.
3 It is also worth noting that capacity owned by investor-owned 
utilities for the most part is under state regulation, has fixed-price obligations to native 
load, and is not necessarily operated for pure profit maximization purposes. 
Thus, close to a quarter of the total generating capacity of the U.S. power industry is 
in the hands of public entities. Furthermore, it is not possible to think of the U.S. as a 
single market. Due to the way the industry has historically been organized, despite 
significant amounts of entry by independent generators and divestiture by traditional 
utilities, there are many small markets secluded from each other because of insufficient 
interregional transmission capacity and the way grid operation and pricing are set up. In 
some markets the share of private and public generators in production is more balanced, 
while in others either public or private utilities dominate. 
As already mentioned above, analysis of a mixed electricity market can also be 
thought to apply to a wholesale power industry where regulated private firms and 
unregulated private firms are competing, rather than public and private firms. Thus, it 
would also apply to certain states in the U.S. (such as California, New York, Illinois, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, etc.), where vertically-integrated utilities that are still partially 
regulated compete against unregulated independent generators. 
                                                           
1 To cite an example, in Norway the breakdown of installed capacity by type of ownership is as follows: 
about 30 percent state owned, 15 percent privately owned, and the rest owned and operated by 
municipalities. For shares in actual production a very similar pattern is observed (we thank Tor Arnt 
Johnsen and Trond Espen Haug for providing us with data on Norway). See Hall (1999) for a general 
account of publicly owned electricity companies in Europe. 
2 Source: Vattenfall, Annual Report, 2005. 
3 Source: American Public Power Association, 2006-07 Annual Directory & Statistical Report, page 22 
<http://www.appanet.org/files/PDFs/nameplate2004.pdf>. 
  2In addition to the countries discussed above, many other countries, developed as well 
as developing, have already partly privatized and/or totally restructured their electricity 
industries or are in the process of doing so. It is evident that it will take a long time, if it 
will ever happen, for all countries to sell all of their public generation assets. Therefore, 
the wholesale generation segment of electricity industry may remain a mixed oligopoly 
for many years, with public and private firms operating together.  
Profit maximization has typically not been a significant part of the objective of public 
generation companies. In Sweden, for example, Vattenfall's formal objective has been to 
break even, with depreciation on replacement values and a rate of interest on loans from 
the government at the bond rate level being included. Pricing in the wholesale market for 
bulk power has been indirectly regulated through state ownership of Vattenfall. This has 
established Vattenfall as a price leader, and yardstick competition between public and 
private generators has created a downward price pressure. As in Sweden, the formal, 
government-enforced regulations have historically been fairly weak in Norway and in 
Finland as well.  Instead, the industries are to a large extent characterized by publicly 
owned dominant firm leadership, self-enforced club-regulation, and yardstick 
competition. In U.S. public generators are by law required not to maximize profit. 
In this paper we model the workings of a mixed duopolistic wholesale electricity 
market as a two stage game. In the first stage, the public authority (government or 
regulator) assigns an objective function to the public (or regulated) generator. This 
objective function takes the form of a weighted average of consumers’ surplus and 
profits of the public generator. In the second stage the public generator engages in a 
Cournot competition (i.e. simultaneous quantity-setting game) with a private generator. 
The private generator chooses its output to maximize its own profits, whereas the public 
generator makes its output decision to maximize the objective function assigned to it in 
the first stage, i.e. a weighted average of its own profits and consumers’ surplus. 
We study a three-node electricity network, which is the minimum configuration that 
allows us to analyze the effects of loop flows.  Each pair of these nodes is connected by 
a transmission line with some fixed thermal capacity. The private and the public 
generators are located at two separate nodes and the consumers are located at the third 
node. There is no demand for power on nodes where the producers are located and 
there is no generation capacity available on the node where the consumers are located. 
The transmission network is subject to congestion due to capacity constraints on lines 
connecting the generators and consumers. 
The transmission network over which the generators are connected and serve the 
customers is operated by an Independent System Operator (ISO) that utilizes a market-
based congestion management system. Reliability of the transmission network is 
achieved via explicit nodal transmission price signals to the generators. Each generator 
is required to pay a nodal transmission congestion charge for each unit of injection and 
withdrawal of electricity on each node. The congestion charge on a node can be 
positive, zero or negative, depending on the impact of the injection (or withdrawal) on 
the transmission constraint. Nodal transmission prices are determined based on the 
principle that all participants pay proportionally for their contribution to a binding 
transmission line constraint the ISO has to control for. Another (and equivalent) way to 
look at the same principle is that all participants pay (or get paid) for the externality they 
cause on the other participants, in terms of exacerbating or relieving the congestion on 
the constrained transmission facility. 
  3The transmission network model we employ is consistent with the congestion 
management and pricing methods used in most U.S. ISO and RTO (Regional 
Transmission Organization) markets (PJM, Midwest ISO, ISO New England, New York 
ISO, California ISO), called Locational Marginal Pricing or, as it is better known with its 
acronym, LMP. The price at each node is comprised of two separate components, 
energy and congestion.
4 The energy price is the “system lambda”, or the would-be 
marginal clearing price in the system in the absence of a transmission constraint. The 
congestion component is the charge reflecting the node’s contribution to the 
transmission congestion being controlled for. The total effective price on a node is the 
sum of the two and applies to every participant equally located at that node. 
With a market for transmission congestion rights in the model, the equilibrium of the 
system is defined as generation levels, an energy price, and nodal transmission 
congestion prices such that both the energy market and the transmission congestion 
rights market are in equilibrium. We assume the electricity market is characterized by 
Cournot competition between the generators whereas the transmission congestion rights 
market is competitive. That is, the generators take the nodal transmission prices as 
given when they make their optimal short-run production decisions. The formal definition 
of the equilibrium concept we employ is presented in Section 3 below. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the general features of 
the loop flow network model we study. In Section 3 we analyze the equilibria both when 
the transmission constraint is not binding and when it is binding. In Section 4 we study 
the profits of the ISO and the public generator in each type of equilibrium and discuss 
how we use these for equilibrium selection when there are multiple equilibria. In Section 
5 we analyze the optimal choice of objective function for the public/regulated generator 
as a regulatory policy. In Section 6 we provide a summary of our results and offer some 
concluding remarks. Proofs of all of the propositions and the results on the profits of the 
ISO and the public generator are relegated to the two appendices at the end. 
 
2 The  Model 
 
We consider a simple model of the electricity sector where there are two generators 
supplying electricity to a single market.
5 One of these generators, denoted by  , is 
purely private and its objective is to maximize its profit. The other one is a public or 
regulated one, denote by 
P
R , and it is assumed to maximize a weighted average of 
consumers' surplus and its own profits. That is, the public generator's objective function 
is assumed to be 
  () ( 1 ) () R CS γ γ ⋅ +−Π⋅  (1) 
where   is the total consumers' surplus,  () CS ⋅ () R Π ⋅  is its own profit, and  [ ] 0,1 γ ∈  is the 
weight on consumers' surplus. Note that the case of  0 γ =  refers to a pure private 
generator and  1 γ =  to a generator concerned solely with maximizing consumers' 
surplus. 
                                                           
4 LMP in ISO regions consist of three components: energy, congestion and losses. However, since we will 
ignore transmission losses in our model, total nodal prices comprise of energy and congestion only. 
5 The configuration of the electricity network is similar to the model studied in Joskow and Tirole (2000). 
  4We assume that the network is a three-node network, which is the simplest model of 
electricity network that involves loop-flows in electricity transmission (see Figure 1). In 
this case electricity sent from one node to the other not only affects the flow on the line 
connecting these two nodes, but also the congestion on the other two lines. We study a 
simple three-node network with two generation nodes and one consumption node. The 
public generator is located on node 1, the private generator is located on node 2, and 
consumers are located on node 3.
6 There is no generation on node 3 and no 
consumption on node 1 or node 2. 
 
Figure 1: Transmission Network Representation 
 
 
The transmission line between two generation nodes is assumed to have a given 
capacity of K . The implication of this in our model, which is a consequence of electricity 
flowing from the generators to the consumers following the path of least resistance
7, is a 
constraint on   and   given by  R q P q
  3 RP qq K −≤. (2) 
                                                           
6 There are multiple reasons for connecting the two generation nodes, even if this creates a loop flow. 
First, to increase the reliability of the network; in case of an outage of one of the lines connecting the 
generators directly to the consumers, both generators continue to supply electricity through the indirect 
line. In fact, a reliable operations dispatch procedure employed by all dispatchers (utility or ISO) called “n-
1 contingency dispatch” is a reflection of this fact. Second, the market we are modeling can be interpreted 
as a sub-market in a larger interconnection with fixed available transmission capacities or transmission 
reservations on the lines, in which case the line connecting the two generators serves other transactions 
in other sub-markets and thus our ISO does not have the discretion to dismantle it. 
7 This is because electrons follow a unique path on an electrical transmission network determined by 
Kirchoff's Law rather than the direction of trade. 
  5The grid is operated by an Independent System Operator (ISO) that is in charge of 
ensuring the safe and reliable utilization of the grid by auctioning transmission 
congestion rights, or Transmission Capacity Reservations (TCRs), as in Smeers and 
Wei (1997). The nodal transmission rights allow the generators to withdraw and inject up 
to a specific amount of electricity from and into the transmission network at a specified 
transmission node. As in Smeers and Wei (1997), it is assumed that transmission rights 
are actively traded at pre-dispatch time. Let  1 λ ,  2 λ  and  3 λ  be the prices of the TCRs at 
nodes 1, 2 and 3, respectively.  i λ  is the price of withdrawing a unit of electricity from 
node i, i.e. an entity would have to pay  i λ  to withdraw a unit of electricity from (and pay 
i λ −  to inject into) node i, in addition to the price of the unit of electricity. Without loss of 
generality, we normalize the TCR prices by setting  1 0 λ = . 
Generators compete in two markets; the electricity generation market and the TCR 
market. In the electricity generation market generators are assumed to engage in 
Cournot competition, i.e. they compete by simultaneously choosing output levels. The 
quantities they choose are pre-dispatch quantities submitted to the ISO that is in charge 
of the reliable operation of the transmission network. They also purchase and sell 
transmission rights at the TCR market, which is also administered by the ISO. Both 
generators are assumed to take TCR prices as given in making their decisions, i.e., the 
TCR market is competitive. 
The equilibrium condition in the TCR market takes into account the externality each 
generator imposes on the other when transmitting a unit of electricity. When the grid is 
not congested, production by a generator does not impose any positive or negative 
externality on the other, implying TCR prices of  23 0 λ λ = =  in equilibrium. However, 
when the grid is congested, an additional unit of production by one generator creates a 
positive externality on the other by decongesting the line connecting them. The private 
generator, located on node 2, receives  2 λ  at node 2 and pays  3 λ  at node 3 for each unit 
of electricity it sends from node 2 to node 3. Hence the marginal transmission cost for 
the private generator is  32 λ λ − . Similarly, the public generator located at node 1 receives 
1(0 ) λ ≡  at node 1 and pays  3 λ  at node 3 for each unit of electricity it sends from node 1 
to node 3, implying that the public generator is willing to pay up to  3 λ  to benefit from the 
positive externality created by the additional unit of production by the private generator. 
In equilibrium we must have  32 3 λ λ −= − λ
0
 (marginal cost = marginal benefit), or 
  23 2 λ λ − = . (3) 
When this condition is not met, a trader can earn profits through pure arbitrage, by 
paying both generators the market price to ramp up their productions by a unit each and 
collecting the associated TCRs from both. This would continue to meet the line 
constraint and result in a net profit for the trader if the TCR prices do not meet the above 
condition. In equilibrium no generator wants to hold more or fewer TCRs than it already 
has. 
Throughout this chapter we study the short-run output decisions of the generators 
and assume a constant returns to scale short-run production technology of  () ii i i Cq c q = , 
where   is the output of generator  i q , iR P = . 
  6The consumers' demand for power is represented by an affine inverse demand 
function,  () p Qa Q =−, where  . Defining  R Qq q ≡+ P ii ac α = − , , iR P = , as the grade of 




Assumption 1:  0, , i iR P α >= . 
Assumption 2:  { } 2 0, , , ,  ij ij R P i j αα −> ∈ ≠ . 
 
Assumption 1 states that each generator finds it profitable to serve the whole market 
on its own. Assumption 2 posits that the marginal cost differential between the two 
generators is not “too large” and it guarantees that when both generators are pure profit 
maximizers, the equilibrium is an interior one when the transmission capacity constraint 
is not binding. 
With the above cost and demand specifications, the private generator's maximization 
problem becomes 
  [ ] 32 0 () ( )
P
PP R P P q Max q q q q αλ
≥ Π= − + − − P λ . 
Note that the profits of the private generator involve a separate component, namely 
32 () P q λ λ − , which arises from payments due to having to acquire TCRs for each unit of 
electricity generated and delivered. On the other hand, the public generator's 
maximization problem becomes 




() ( 1 ) ()
2 R
RR P R R P R q Max q q q q q q γγ α
≥




Note that the first term (weighted by γ) involves the effect of consumers' surplus on the 
public generator's objective function, while the second term (weighted by (1-γ)) shows its 
profit arising from production and transmission. 
 
Analysis of Equilibria 
 
Given the above description of equilibrium in the TCR market, equilibrium in the overall 
system is characterized by the following conditions: 
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•  Feasibility in the TCR market: 
  3 RP qq K −≤ (6) 
•  Equilibrium in the TCR market: 
  23 20 λ λ − =  (7) 
  7Expressions in (4) and (5) above are the first order conditions for the public and 
private generators, respectively, in the (constrained) maximization problem they face 
when they compete by choosing their quantities independently, while taking the TCR 
prices  2 λ  and  3 λ  as given. As we show below, for a given γ and K , there may exist an 
''unconstrained'' equilibrium where the transmission capacity constraint in (6) is not 
binding in equilibrium, as well as ''constrained'' equilibria where it is binding (each 
equilibrium involving different  2 λ  and  3 λ .) 
3.1 Unconstrained  Equilibria 
We first look at the case where the capacity of the line connecting the two generators, 
, is sufficiently large so that the grid is not congested for any value of γ. K
8 As discussed 
in Section 2 above, in this case we have  23 0 λ λ = =  in equilibrium. The public 
generator's response function is 
 
[ ) P
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while the private generator's response function becomes 
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 (9) 
Note that the (''unconstrained'') response function of the public generator depends on 
γ. When both γ and   are large enough, the public generator's best response is to 
produce just enough to complete the total output to   (at which point the market is 






γ <  the public 
generator’s and the private generator's outputs are strategic substitutes while the 
negative slope changes beyond 














γ =  the public 
generator's response function is vertical at  R q R α =  until  RP qqa + = , at which point the 
slope changes to -1. For 
1
2
γ > , public and private generators’ outputs become strategic 
                                                           
8 In fact, a sufficient condition for there to be no congestion for any γ is 
3
a









, there is no kink in the response function. 
  8complements. This is due to the fact that the public generator puts a relatively larger 
weight on consumer surplus than on its profits when 
1
2
γ > . 
When the private generator increases its output a ve
output, price decreases. This leads to an increase e
t a gi n level of public generator's 
 in th  consumers’ surplus and a 
decrease in the public generator's profit. The optimal response for the public generator 
is to increase its output until the increase in consumer surplus weighted by γ is just equal 
to the decrease in marginal profit weighted by 1 γ − . The fact that γ, the weight on 
consumer surplus, is greater than 
1
2
 results in an increase rather than a decrease in 
public generator's output as an optimal response to an increase in private generator's 
output. On the other hand, a decrease in the private generator's output will lead to a 
decrease in the public generator's output as the optimal response for the same reason. 
Let ( )
U
R q γ  and  ( )
U
P q γ  be the unconstrained equilibrium output levels of the public and 
private generators, respectively, for a given γ. The (unconstrained) equilibrium output 
choices by the public an
 
d private generators are 
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  9 
Figure 2: Response Functions with a Less Efficient Private Generator 
 
 
Note that in Figure 2 where the public generator has a lower marginal cost, we have 
1
2
γ < . When the public generator has a higher marginal cost, we have 
1
2
γ > . That is, it 
takes a higher γ for the public generator to oust the private one from the market when 
the public generator is the higher cost producer.
10
 
                                                           
10 Such a high level of production by the public generator may entail losses on its part. 
  10 
Figure 3: Response Functions with a More Efficient Private Generator 
 
 
Equations (10) and (11) reveal that there are two types of unconstrained equilibria. In 
the first case, both the public and the private generators produce a positive amount. This 
case corresponds to small values of γ, the weight on consumer's surplus in the public 
generator's objective function. We denote such interior unconstrained equilibria as type 
 equilibria. Whether or not the public generator is the more efficient producer impacts 
the characterization of   type equilibria. It is therefore useful to differentiate between 
 type equilibria where the public generator produces more, which we call   type, 
and where the private generator produces more, which we call   type. When γ is large 
enough, only the public generator produces a positive amount, and we denote such 










As a direct result of Assumption 2, the public generator always produces a positive 
amount, even when  0 γ = , in an unconstrained equilibrium. As shown below, the public 
generator's equilibrium output is increasing in γ in the unconstrained case, therefore, 
  11there does not exist an unconstrained equilibrium where the public generator produces 
zero output. 
From Equation (2) we know that whether there is congestion on the grid depends on 
the difference between the generators' output levels. To facilitate the characterization of 
the constrained equilibria, consider the difference between the unconstrained equilibrium 
output levels of the two generators. Letting  ( ) ( ) ( )
UU U
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To analyze the impact of γ on the nature of equilibria, define  () K γ  as the capacity 
level that makes the unconstrained equilibrium, characterized by equations (3) and (4), 





U Kq γ γ ≡∆  (15) 
When the public generator's objective is solely to maximize profit, i.e. when  0 γ = , the 
difference between the two output levels depends only on the marginal cost differential, 








 for all  [ ] 0,1 γ ∈ , regardless of the relative efficiency of the generators. If 
RP α α ≥ , then   for all  ( ) 0





U qa ∆= > ( )
U q γ ∆  is continuous in γ in the relevant region, there must exist a 
[ ] ˆ0 , 1 γ ∈  such that for  [ ] 0, ˆ γ γ ∈ ,   and for  ( ) 0
U q γ ∆≤ ( ] ˆ,1 γ γ ∈ , ( ) 0
U q γ ∆ > . This threshold 














Note that  ˆ γ  is always less than 
1
2
. Thus, the relative magnitudes of the 
unconstrained equilibrium output levels depend on the relative cost efficiency of the 
generators and the weight attached to the consumer surplus in the public generator's 
objective function. If the public generator is more efficient than the private one, then the 
public generator produces more for any γ. If, on the other hand, the private generator is 
more efficient, then the private generator produces more for smaller levels of γ, i.e. for 
ˆ γ γ < , while the public generator's output is higher as γ increases beyond  ˆ γ . Therefore, 
as the weight attached to consumers' surplus in the objective of the public generator 
increases beyond a threshold, the public generator produces more than its private 
counterpart despite its cost inefficiency. 
  12Figure 4:Threshold Capacity Levels with a Less Efficient Private Generator 
 
 
Figure 4 depicts  () K γ  for  RP α α > . Note from this figure that  () K γ  lies within the 
interval  ,
33
RP a αα − ⎡
⎢ ⎣⎦
⎤
⎥ . For a given  [ ] 0,1 γ ∈ , if  () KK γ ≥ , then the equilibrium output 
levels are the unconstrained output levels characterized by Equations (3) and (4) above. 










RP α α > .  
Figure 5 shows  () K γ  for  RP α α < . In this case  () K γ  resides in the interval [ ] 3 , 0 a . 
Unconstrained equilibria for given combinations of K  and γ are shown in Figure 5. The 
proposition below summarizes the results on unconstrained equilibria for both cases. 
 
Proposition 1: Let  () ,
3
a





 for a given γ. Then 
1. If  R α α > , then the unconstrained equilibrium will be of type   f o r  
1
R U 0, γ γ ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎣ ⎦ , 
and of type   f o r  
2
R U ,1 γ γ ⎡⎤ ∈⎣⎦ ; 
2.  If  RP α α < , then the unconstrained equilibrium will be of type   f o r  
1
P U [ ] 0, ˆ γ γ ∈ , of 
type   f o r  
1
R U ˆ, γ γγ ⎡ ∈⎣⎤ ⎦ , and of type   f o r  
2
R U ,1 γ γ ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎣ ⎦ . 
 
Figure 5: Threshold Capacity Levels with a More Efficient Private Generator 
 
  143.2 Constrained  Equilibria 
For a given γ, if  () KK γ < , then the equilibrium necessarily involves congestion on the 
grid. Since the capacity constraint involves the absolute value of the difference between 
output levels, there are potentially two equilibria for each level of  () KK γ < . That is, with 
congestion the TCR prices  2 λ  and  3 λ  are no longer zero, and there are two sets of  2 λ  
and  3 λ  that satisfy Equations (4)-(7). 
 
Figure 6: Generator Response Functions for a Given γ′ 
 
 
Figure 6 displays the response functions of the generators for a given γ′. In this case 
point   is an (unconstrained) equilibrium for a capacity level  U γ′ ≥ () KK . Take a 
() KK γ′ < . The lines implied by  3 RP qq K −= correspond to the capacity constraint in 
this case. In the TCR market nodal transmission rights are traded, and the equilibrium 
TCR prices shift the best response functions of the two generators such that equilibrium 
in the electricity market occurs at either point   or point B , where the response 
functions (8) and (9), the TCR market equilibrium condition 
A
23 20 λ λ − =  and the capacity 
constraint lines  3() RP qq K γ −=  are satisfied simultaneously for γ γ′ = . 
 
  15Example 
We present the following simple example to illustrate the role of TCRs. Consider the 
case where  0 γ =  and  RP α α > . In this case, the unconstrained equilibrium output levels 

















= , (18) 
respectively. Since  RP α α > , at the unconstrained equilibrium the public generator 




R q P α α ∆ =− . Now suppose that 
3 RPK α α −>, i.e. the unconstrained equilibrium is not attainable. In order to bring 
production in line with the capacity constraint, the effective cost of production to the 
public generator needs to be increased while the effective cost of production to the 
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>  (22) 
In one of the constrained equilibria the public generator produces more, and in the 
other it produces less. In both cases the public generator pays  3
C λ  (a different positive 
amount in each case) at the margin for each unit of electricity transmitted, thus raising its 
effective marginal cost to  3
C
R c λ + . The private generator, on the other hand, receives  2
C λ  
and pays  3
C λ  for each unit of electricity it transmits, bringing its effective marginal cost to 
 in each case. With the introduction of these congestion prices, the 
response function of each generator moves accordingly. One could also interpret this 
“adjustment” in terms of prices rather than costs. The effective price the public generator 




P c λλ +−< P c
3
CC p p λ −<
C
, while the 
private generator would be selling the same good at an effective price of 
32
CCC p p λλ −+>. 
 
As in the case of unconstrained equilibria, there is a type of constrained equilibrium 
where both generators produce strictly positive levels of output, as well as another type 
of constrained equilibrium where only the public generator produces. We denote the 
constrained equilibria where both generators produce strictly positive amounts as 
equilibria of type 
1 C , and the equilibria where only the public generator produces as 
equilibria of type  . An equilibrium where 
2 C 3 RP qq K − =  holds is denoted as  , and an 
1
R C
  16equilibrium where   holds is denoted as  . In other words,   is a 
constrained equilibrium where the public generator produces more, whereas   is a 
constrained equilibrium where the private generator produces more. We now turn to the 
characterization of each type of equilibrium. 








1 C  Type Equilibria 



















The equilibrium values for the variables under consideration in this case are: 
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RR CC λ λ =   (27) 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 





R C KKγ < . Note 
from Equation (25) that when   exceeds  K
1
()
R C K γ , the private generator runs losses and 
hence chooses not to produce. Figure 7 and Figure 8 display the equilibria for the cases 
where  RP α α >  and  PR α α > , respectively. Observe from these Figures that   type 
equilibrium may exist in regions where unconstrained equilibrium also exists. 
1
R C
  17Figure 7: Types of Equilibrium with a Less Efficient Private Firm 
 



































The equilibrium values for the variables under consideration in this case are: 
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P C λ λ =  (32) 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 





P C KKγ < . 
Note from Equation (24) that when   exceeds  K
1
()
P C K γ , the public firm chooses not to 
produce. Figure 7 and Figure 8 also display 
1
()
P C K γ  and show on the   space the 
regions where   type equilibrium is obtained. Note again that   type equilibrium may 
exist in regions where unconstrained equilibrium also exists. 






2 C  Type Equilibria 
2
R C  type equilibria are characterized in the following proposition. 
 















The equilibrium values for the variables under consideration in this case are: 









P q γ =  (35) 
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3 (1 ) 3 (2 3 )
R C







R C λ λ =  (37) 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 







R C K γ  curve on which they coincide). Figure 7 and Figure 8 display the regions where 
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R C  type equilibria are attained. Observe again that   type equilibria may exist in 
regions where unconstrained equilibrium also exists. 
2
R C
























R q γ =  (39) 
















P C λ λ =  (42) 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 








P C K γ  curve on which they coincide). Figure 7 and Figure 8 display the 
regions where   type equilibria are attained. Note once more that   type equilibria 





Some of our results may seem counter-intuitive at first glance; in particular, existence 
of an equilibrium where the private firm produces more than, or even ousts from the 
market, the public generator even when the public firm is the more efficient generator. 
It’s worth noting that such counter-intuitive outcomes happen only in constrained 
equilibria and they are never the only possible outcomes; there are always other 
equilibria for the same parameter values with the “expected” outcome. However, as we 
discuss in detail below, in any equilibrium where the public generator is ousted from the 
market, the ISO runs a loss. That is, to support an equilibrium where the private 
generator is the only firm that produces, the ISO effectively has to “subsidize” the private 
generator (or a penalty to the public generator, or both) via generous transmission rights 
prices favoring the private generator. As we show below, once some reasonable 
constraints on the profits of the ISO are imposed for equilibrium selection, such counter-
intuitive outcomes are eliminated. 
 
4 
any ISO that uses market-based congestion management, TCR pricing involves 
Profits of the ISO and the Public Generator 
The profits of the ISO and the public generator may be of concern for a number of 
reasons. The ISO is in charge of administering the TCR market and operating the 
transmission network. The TCR market is assumed to operate much like a competitive 
market, each generator taking the transmission prices it faces as given and equilibrium 
prices being those that equate demand and supply for transmission rights at each node. 
We have not ascribed a separate objective function to the ISO other than perhaps 
allowing it to act like a ''Walrasian auctioneer'' in the TCR market, announcing the final 
prices that will drive the TCR market into equilibrium. In our model, as in the operation of 
  21transfers to and from the ISO depending on the signs of  2 λ  and  3 λ , as well as the 
relative magnitudes of  R q  and  P q . The profits of the ISO are g en by 
  33 2 () IS R P qq
iv
O λ λλ Π= + −  
and given that  23 2 λ λ =  in equilibrium, the equilibrium evel of ISO profits will be   l
  3() ISO R P qq λ Π= − . (43) 
Note that when the equilibrium is unconstrained, we have  23 0 λ λ == , and hence 
0 SO = . However, in the case of constrained equilibria, profits of the ISO can be 
or negative, as indicated by Equation (43) above. 
It may very well be the case that the public authority (g
I Π
positive 
overnment) requires that the 
ISO runs no losses. Recall also from our characterization of constrained equilibria in 
Section 3.2 above that for each given pair of K  and γ, there will be one set of  2 λ  and  3 λ  
that corresponds to the constraint  3 RP qq K − =  in equilibrium, and ano er th  
corresponds to  3 PR qq K −=. It may be the case that the ISO profits are positive for one 
case and nega  other. We may then use the non-negative ISO profit 
requirement as an equilibrium selection criterion. 
In the Appendix, we present a detailed analysis
th at
tive for the
 of the profits of the ISO in constrained 
equilibria. As to be expected, the sign of the ISO profits in a constrained equilibrium (be 
it of 
1
R C , 
1
P C , 
2
R C  or 
2
P C  type) depends, among other things, on the relative efficiency of 
the p lic generator versus the private one. Figure 9 depicts the ISO profits in the  ub ( ) ,K γ  
space for the case where  RP α α > , and Figure 10 does the same for the case  RP α α < . 
As for the profits of the  generator, recall that the public generator’s  public  objective 
ma
t iled analysis of the profits of the public 
ge
y involve concern for consumers' surplus. In cases where a large enough weight is 
placed on consumers' surplus in relation to profits, i.e. for a large γ, a constrained 
equilibrium outcome may involve negative profits for the public generator. Perhaps more 
so than the case for ISO, it is again plausible that the public generator faces a 
nonnegative profit constraint. As in the case of the ISO profits, the sign of public 
generator's profits can also be used as an equilibrium selection criterion when there are 
multiple equilibria for a given pair of K  and γ. 
In the Appendix, we also presen  a deta
nerator in all types of constrained and unconstrained equilibria, although we do not 
impose any constraints on the public firm’s profits for equilibrium selection in the model. 
Unlike the case for the ISO profits, public generator's profits can be negative or positive 
in unconstrained equilibria as well in constrained equilibria. We note here that profits of 
the public generator are always nonnegative for 
1
R U  type equilibrium. In a 
2
R U  type 
equilibrium, where  , γ γγ ⎡⎤ ∈⎣⎦ , the public generator's profits are positive when  RP α α > , 




  22Figure 9: Profits of the ISO with a Less Efficient Private Generator 
 




5 Choice  of  γ as a Regulatory Policy 
 
The equilibrium levels of production calculated above are for a given   and γ. Observe 
that  γ, the weight given to consumers' surplus in the public generator's objective 
function, can be viewed as a policy tool. This brings out the question of choosing γ 
optimally. We take the total surplus 
K
   
0
(,; , ) ( ) ( ) (,) (,) (,)
RP qq
RP PRP RRP I S ORP Wq q K PQd Q PQQ q q q q q q γ
+
= − +Π +Π +Π ∫
as the measure of welfare, which, given the specifications of our model, becomes 
  24 
2
(,; , ) ( )
2
RP R R PP
Q
Wq q K Q q γα αα =− − − . (44) 
Recall that for a given K  and γ, there will exist multiple equilibria. In order to carry out 
welfare analysis of any sort we have to deal with the multiplicity of equilibria. As argued 
in Section 4 above, a plausible criterion to select among equilibria in our case is to look 
at the profits of the ISO as well as those of the public generator. Using the analysis for 
that section (presented in the Appendix), we first eliminate equilibria that involve 
negative profits for the ISO. If after this elimination there still remain multiple equilibria 
with nonnegative profits for the ISO, we choose the one that leaves the ISO with zero 
profits. The ISO has a rather neutral role in the way we modeled the operation of the 
transmission network. In fact, the ISO simply coordinates the functioning of the TCR 
market. While it is plausible to insist that the ISO does not run any losses, it is also 
plausible to assume that it is left with minimum profits (in our case zero profits.) This 
approach is also consistent with the operation of major U.S. ISOs (PJM, Midwest ISO, 
ISO New England, New York ISO, California ISO), which are private companies that are 
required to operate at zero profits. 
Applying these selection criteria on Figure 7 and Figure 8, we arrive at Figure 11 and 
Figure 12, which display the single equilibrium selected in relevant regions of the (, ) K γ  
space for the cases of  RP α α >  and  RP α α < , respectively. In computing the optimal 
value of γ, we consider the cases where the public generator is more efficient than the 
private generator, and where it is less efficient, separately for the sake of clarity of 
exposition. 
5.1  Optimal Policy with a More Efficient Public Generator 
For the case of  RP α α > , the equilibrium selection process just outlined shows that when 
the transmission capacity   exceeds  K
3
a
 the equilibrium is unconstrained for any γ, 
being of the   type for 
1
R U 0, γ γ ⎡ ∈⎣⎤ ⎦  and of the   type for 
2




KK γ ⎡⎤ ∈⎢ ⎣⎦ ⎥ , we have a   type equilibrium. For 
1
R U 0, γ γ ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎣ ⎦  and  [ ] 1 0, ( ) KK γ ∈ , we have 
a  type equilibrium. For 
1
R C   , γ γγ⎤ ⎦  and  ⎡ ∈⎣ 2 KK () ,
3
a
γ ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
, we have a type 
2
R U  equilibrium. 
For 
** , γ γγ ⎡⎤ ∈⎣⎦ , where 










KK 2 () M i n K γγ ,
⎡ ⎤
∈ ⎧⎫
⎨⎬ ⎢ ⎥ ⎩⎭ ⎣ ⎦
we have a   type equilibrium. Finally, for 
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KM i n Kγ
3
⎧ ⎫ ≤ ⎨ ⎬
⎩⎭
 we ha
 type equilibrium 11
ve a 
 (see Figure  ). 
1
R C
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≡  as the γ at which equilibrium 









  26below characterizes the optimal regulatory policy for different levels of   when the 
public generator is more efficient than the private one. 
K
 
Proposition 6: Suppose  RP α α > . Then the optimal regulatory policy is to set 
*
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Proof: See Appendix. 
 
It is easy to see that the optimal γ in this case is never less than half. In other words, 
when the public generator is more efficient, the optimal regulatory policy always gives 
(equal or) more weight to the consumers’ surplus in the public generator’s objective. 
When the transmission line capacity is high enough, the optimal instruction is to give 
equal weights to profits and consumers’ surplus. Weight of the consumers’ surplus 
increases (γ rises from half) as the transmission line capacity falls below a threshold. 
However, optimal γ never reaches 1, that is, optimal policy stops short of instructing pure 
consumers’ surplus maximization. Profits of the public firm are always part of optimal 
regulatory policy. 
5.2  Optimal Policy with a Less Efficient Public Generator 
For the case of  R α α > , the equilibrium selection process outlined above results in the 
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P C KKγ < . 
 
                                                           




P C [ ] 1 , 4 3 ∈ γ  
and  , thus our equilibrium selection criteria will not apply here. However, as will be seen in 
Proposition 7, the optimal γ never falls in this region 
() γ
1
P C K K ∈
  27Figure 12: Equilibrium Selection with a More Efficient Private Firm 
 
 
Proposition 7: Suppose  RP α α < . Then the optimal regulatory policy is to set 
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Proof: See Appendix. 
 
  28According to Proposition 7, if the private generator is more efficient, then there is a 
tradeoff between allocative efficiency and productive efficiency when the less efficient 
public generator gets to increase its output with higher γ. After a point, it does not pay, in 
terms of total surplus, to have the less efficient public generator displace production by 
the more efficient private generator, and the optimal objective policy stops short of 
maximizing consumers’ surplus.  
It’s easily checked that  2 1  is the highest possible optimal choice of γ in this case, 
therefore optimal regulatory policy always puts more (or equal) weight on profits than on 
consumers’ surplus when the private generator is more efficient. In fact, if both the 
transmission line capacity and the efficiency gap between the two generators (private 
generator being more efficient) are high enough, then the optimal regulatory policy is to 
instruct the public firm to maximize profits only. 
 
6 
                                                          
Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
It is well known from the Industrial Organization literature that in a standard industry 
structure without externalities, if a public firm competes with private firms in an 
imperfectly competitive market (i.e. in a 'mixed' market) social welfare might in certain 
cases be higher when the public firm is instructed to maximize profits instead of 
maximizing total surplus (consumers’ surplus plus producers’ surplus).
12 The basic 
intuition behind this result is that when a public firm is instructed to maximize total 
surplus, in some cases it tends to produce so much that gains to consumers from high 
consumption levels are dominated by the allocative inefficiency caused by inefficient 
public production displacing more efficient private production. Only in a sequential 
quantity setting game where the public firm is the Stackelberg leader, instructing the 
public firm to maximize total surplus may indeed lead to higher social welfare.
13
In contrast to the studies mentioned above, in this paper we model the public 
generator as a firm that maximizes a weighted average of consumers’ surplus and its 
own (short-run) profits. Consumers’ surplus maximization is significantly easier to 
instruct or implement institutionally than total surplus maximization, making it a more 
realistic modeling assumption on how public/regulated firms operate. For example, in the 
case of a publicly-owned company, consumers’ surplus can be made a part of the public 
firm’s objective by appointing a number of consumer representatives to the board of 
directors or to the upper management. On the other hand, there does not seem to be an 
obvious way of representing the private firm’s financial interests in the public firm’s 
objective, as it may look inappropriate or create a conflict of interest to place, say, a 
large shareholder of the private firm in the public firm’s board or upper management. In 
the case of a regulated private firm, like the vertically integrated utilities in the U.S. 
serving customers on cost of service regulated bundled rates, the state utility regulatory 
commission can achieve a representation of both consumers’ surplus and profits of the 
regulated firm by allowing the regulated firm to keep a share of the profits from off-
system sales. This way, the regulated firm still has an incentive to increase its profits, 
but not to the extent a purely private unregulated firm does, as well as an incentive to be 
 
12 See De Fraja and Delbano (1989, 1990). See also Cremer, Marchand, and Thisse (1989) for a model in 
which the public firm is used as an instrument for regulating an oligopolistic market. 
13 See Sertel (1988). 
  29concerned about the consumers’ surplus. The bigger share of profits from off-system 
sales the regulated firm can keep, the larger is the weight of profits in the objective of the 
regulated firm is.  
Also, the results on mixed markets mentioned above do not cover some of the 
interesting features that are observed in electricity markets. For example, when the 
network involves more than two nodes, e.g. when two different suppliers at two different 
nodes are connected to the same third node where consumption takes place, certain 
network externalities will arise. This is due to existence of loop flows in electricity 
transmission. When different nodes are connected over a transmission network, a trade 
between two parties can affect a non-participating third party (positively or negatively) by 
congesting or de-congesting the connecting lines that the third-party uses and thus 
altering the cost the third party faces or the quantity it will be able to sell at a particular 
node. 
In this paper we used a competitive nodal transmission congestion rights market as 
the congestion management and pricing tool where each generator has to pay an 
explicit congestion charge in the amount of its contribution to congestion on the 
constrained facility. Introduction of such transmission rights brings complications, as well 
as benefits, to the model. The main complication we need to deal with is the multiplicity 
of equilibrium. For a given level of transmission capacity and a given regulatory policy, 
sometimes there is an equilibrium where the line is congested, as well as an equilibrium 
where there is no congestion on the grid. In other instances, for the same model 
parameters, there is an equilibrium where the line is congested in one direction, as well 
as an equilibrium where the line is congested in the other direction. This complication is 
primarily due to the flexibility that the transmission rights prices bring into the model, 
despite the fact that these prices cannot be set arbitrarily but they have to be such that 
marginal transmission price a generator faces equals to the marginal foregone profits in 
the electricity market. Even with this rationality restriction on them, different sets of 
transmission rights prices can be used to support multiple equilibrium outcomes in the 
electricity market and the corresponding congestion patterns. 
To make any kind of a welfare analysis and choose optimal regulatory policy, the 
multiplicity of equilibrium issue has to be resolved. We use the profits of the ISO as the 
criterion for equilibrium refinement. The profits of the ISO are simply the difference 
between what it collects and pays out in the operation of the transmission congestion 
rights market. We assume that the ISO operates under a breakeven constraint, that is, 
its payouts in the TCR market cannot exceed its revenues. If there are still multiple 
equilibria after imposing the breakeven condition, we used a second refinement that the 
ISO set prices such that it operates with zero profits. The second refinement amounts to 
selecting an unconstrained equilibrium when there is also a constrained equilibrium (with 
different production levels and TCR prices) where the ISO makes positive profits. After 
imposing these two criteria on the ISO’s profits, there is a unique equilibrium for each 
given set of parameters. 
We used the equilibrium quantities computed to study the optimal choice of the 
objective function for the public firm in competing with its private counterpart. This 
exercise can be seen as analysis of optimal regulatory policy in the context of a 
public/private mixed oligopolistic wholesale electricity market, where the public generator 
plays a regulatory role by its sheer existence in the market with an objective function 
different than profit maximization. The objective function followed by the public generator 
  30affects the equilibrium outcomes in a non-trivial manner and the choice of the objective 
function for the public generator can be viewed as choice of a particular regulatory 
policy. 
Optimal choice of objective function for the public firm can also be viewed as a search 
for optimal level of privatization for the public generator. If one assumes that the 
objective of the public owners (consumer surplus maximization) and that of the private 
owners (profit maximization) are represented in the objective function of the generator 
according to ownership shares, then the optimal objective function will indicate whether 
the generator should be left in public hands (and aim at maximizing consumers’ surplus 
in competing with its private counterpart), fully privatized (hence end up maximizing 
profit only just as the other, private, generator), or should be partially privatized with less 
than 100% of shares in private hands. In that case the question will concern the optimal 
level of (partial) privatization for the public generator. Level of privatization can therefore 
be viewed as a regulatory policy tool to be set by the public authority. 
Our results indicate that the optimal regulatory policy, weight of the consumers’ 
surplus in the public generator’s objective function, depends on the capacity of the 
transmission line, as well as the relative cost efficiencies of the two generators. If the 
public generator is more efficient, optimal regulatory policy never puts more weight on 
profits than on consumers’ surplus. When transmission line capacity is sufficiently large, 
profits and consumers’ surplus are equally weighted. As the line capacity falls below a 
threshold, optimal policy puts more weight on consumers’ surplus. However, regardless 
of model parameters, including the line capacity, the optimal instruction is never to 
maximize only consumers’ surplus. Therefore, when the public generator is more 
efficient, optimal regulatory policy is a strictly convex combination of profits and 
consumers’ surplus; pure profit maximization or pure consumers’ surplus maximization 
is never the optimal instruction for the public generator. 
If, on the other hand, the private generator is more efficient, then pure profit 
maximization is part of the optimal policy, though only under limiting conditions. When 
the cost efficiency gap is sufficiently large in favor of the private generator and the 
transmission line capacity is above a threshold, it is indeed optimal to instruct the public 
generator to maximize only profits. Aside from this limiting case, optimal regulatory 
policy again is always a strictly convex combination of profits and consumers’ surplus. 
Under no circumstance is pure consumers’ surplus maximization the optimal instruction. 
In fact, when the private generator is more efficient, profits always have a larger weight 
than consumers’ surplus in the optimal regulatory policy. Intuitively, this is because after 
a point marginal welfare losses from replacing low cost private generation with high cost 
public generation starts to outweigh marginal gains from increasing consumers’ surplus. 
One might wonder, in the case of a more efficient public generator, why the optimal 
policy is not simply to set the weight of consumers’ surplus in the public generator’s 
objective function that will induce an equilibrium where the price of electricity is equal to 
the public generator’s (constant) marginal cost and the public generator supplies the 
whole market. The reason is that such a high level of production by the public generator 
is not feasible due to the transmission line capacity constraint without some production 
from the private generator. Private generator’s output is required to create counter-flow 
on the congested transmission line; otherwise the flow on the line exceeds safe flow 
limits, which cannot be tolerated by the ISO that is in charge of reliable operations of the 
grid. In other words, there are no market prices to support that seemingly optimal 
  31configuration simply because the physical configuration of the grid cannot support the 
resulting line flows. In a nutshell, this constraint is the contribution of transmission 
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A. Omitted Proofs in Chapter V 
A1. Proof of Proposition 2 
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proposition. 
 
A2. Proof of Proposition 3 
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which results in the equilibrium quantities for the variables as stated in the proposition. 



















 as stated in the proposition. 
 
A3. Proof of Proposition 4 
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  33which results in the equilibrium quantities for the variables as stated in the proposition. 
Note that the inequality  32 2 PP R qq 0 α λλ −− − + ≤  is satisfied if and only if 
1
()
R C KKγ ≥ , 
as stated in the proposition. 
 
A4. Proof of Proposition 5 
2















0 γ γα λ
αλ λ
λλ
++ − − −− ≤




which results in the equilibrium quantities for the variables as stated in the proposition. 
Note that the inequality  3 () ( 1 ) ( 2) RP R RP qq qq 0 γ γα λ ++ − − −− ≤  is satisfied if and only if 
1
()
P C KKγ ≥ , as stated in the proposition. 
 
A5. Proof of Proposition 6 
Let  RP α α > . We first show that in this case 
1
2
γ =  will be the optimal choice if the total 
surplus maximization is to be attained at an unconstrained equilibrium. 
Note that for each γ we have a unique unconstrained equilibrium with the 
corresponding values for   and  . We perform the welfare optimization in the (,  
space. As γ increases, the equilibrium moves along the reaction function of the private 
generator up to 
R q P q ) NP qq
γ  (i.e. the point where the private generator ceases production). Beyond 
γ , the equilibrium moves along  0 P q =  until  R qa =  (see Figure 2) Using (44) and 
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Differentiating with respect to   we get  R q
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 evaluated at 
P α  is positive. Hence total surplus is maximized by setting either  R q P α =  or  RR q α = . 
Observe that total surplus with  R q R α =  exceeds that with  R q P α = . Therefore, it is 
optimal to choose γ that will induce  R q R α = , i.e. to set 
1
2
γ = . Note that the 
unconstrained equilibrium induced by 
1
2





We now determine the optimal choice if the optimum surplus is to be attained at a 
constrained equilibrium. For a given  , if the equilibrium is to be a constrained one, 
then we have  .
K
3 RP qq K −=
14 Then the maximum total surplus is achieved at   and   
such that the isowelfare curve, defined as the set of output levels by the private and the 
public generator with constant welfare, with   and   is tangent to the constraint line 
. This is so because welfare decreases if the equilibrium moves along 









3 RP qq K −=
3 RP qq K −= RP α α >  in this case). The slope of 
















= , which gives 
us the locus of total surplus maximizing constrained equilibria for different levels of  . 
For   type equilibrium the value of γ that induces the total surplus maximizing 





























Thus, it is optimal to set γ equal to this value, provided that the equilibrium is of   










> , there exists a   type 
equilibrium for an appropriate choice of γ. With 
2
R C
RP α α >  it is optimal to have only the 
public generator produce in this region where   is sufficiently high. Observe from 


















 we have C  type equilibria, all of which 
involve the same output levels and hence the same total surplus.
15 Observe also that 
total surplus decreases if   increases beyond 
*
R Qq = R α . Therefore, for 
                                                           
14 Note that with  RP α α > ,   is the only relevant constraint line.  3 RP qq K −=
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since the unconstrained equilibrium outcome with 
* 1
2
γ =  is attainable, it is optimal to set 





A6. Proof of Proposition 7 
Following the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 6, for a sufficiently large K  
we observe that total surplus is maximized by setting either  43 RR q P α α = −  or  RR q α = . 
Observe that 43 RP P α αα −<  and  RP α α < , implying that the total surplus with 
43 RR q P α α =− exceeds that with  R q R α = . Hence it is optimal to choose the γ that 
induces  43 RR q P α α =− and the corresponding  2( ) PP q R α α = − . Simple calculations 









. Note that 





















and checking the relevant second order condition reveals that it is indeed the global 











 and the total surplus is 




















 is a global minimum and the total surplus is again maximized at  0 γ = . 









 if 54 RP α α > , otherwise it is 





We now determine the optimal choice of   and   if the optimum surplus is to be 
attained at a constrained equilibrium. This is the case for 




< . We first analyze the 









 is the total surplus maximizing value of γ in the 
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α αα − ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
 the equilibrium moves 
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 and 
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. As in the 
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⎥ , it moves along the response function of the private generator 
for 
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⎥ . Since the private generator is more efficient, the optimal 
outcome will involve the private generator producing more, implying that the optimal 
outcome will move along  . The total surplus maximizing output level for the 
private generator in this case is 








α α + +
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. This is so because increasing γ further results in an unconstrained 
equilibrium with the less efficient public generator starting to displace production by the 
more efficient private generator. 
If 54 RP α α < , which is the case where  0 γ =  is the total surplus maximizing choice in 




=  the equilibrium induced by  0 γ =  is 
just binding. The rest of the analysis is identical to the one in the previous case, except 
for the relevant intervals of K . For  ,
33
PR P K
α αα − ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
 it is optimal to set γ equal to 0, 
  37whereas for  0,
3
PR K
α α − ⎡ ∈⎢ ⎣⎦
⎤












similar arguments as above. 
 
 
B. Profits of the ISO and the Public Firm 
B1. Profits of the ISO in Constrained Equilibria 
1 C  type equilibria 






RP qq γ γ > , and thus   if and 
only if 
0 ISO Π≥













≤≡− + ⎢ ⎥ − ⎣ ⎦
. 
Observe from Equations (14) and (15) that  1() K γ  is the portion of  () K γ  for  0, γ γ ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎣ ⎦ . 
1() K γ  is thus the curve separating unconstrained equilibria from the constrained 
equilibria in this region. Note also that the sign of  1() K γ  depends on the relative 
magnitudes of the grades of efficiency,  P α  and  N α . 
Figure 9 shows the relationship between  1() K γ  and 
1
()




γ ⎡⎤ ∈⎢⎥ ⎣⎦




γ ⎛⎤ ∈⎜ ⎥ ⎝⎦
 we have   if and 
only if 
0 ISO Π≥
1() KK γ ≥ . Thus,   for   type equilibrium in the region where  0 ISO Π<
1




R C KK K γ γ ⎤ ∈ ⎦, and   elsewhere in the (, 0 ISO Π≤ ) K γ  space. 
Figure 10 depicts  1() K γ  and 
1
()
R C K γ  when  RP α α < . In this case, for  [0, ˆ) γ γ ∈  we have 
 for   type equilibrium. In the region where  0 ISO Π<
1
R C [ˆ , ] γ γγ ∈  and  (
1
1() , ()
R C KK K γ γ ⎤ ∈ ⎦, 
we again have   for   type equilibrium.  0 ISO Π<
1




γγ ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
 
and  { }
1
1() , ()




γ ⎛⎤ ∈⎜ ⎥ ⎝⎦
. 






PR qq γ γ > , and thus   if and 
only if 
0 ISO Π≥
3 0 λ ≤ . From Equation (31), this is the case if and only if 
  1() KK γ ≤ −  
  38Figure 9 shows the relationship between  1() K γ  and 
1
()




γ ⎡⎤ ∈⎢⎥ ⎣⎦







 we have   if and 
only if 
0 ISO Π≥
1() KK γ ≤ . Let 




* γ γ = . We observe that 
* γ γ <  and 
 only in the region where  0 ISO Π≥
* 0, γ γ ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎣ ⎦ and  (
1
1() , ()
P C KK K γ γ ⎤ ∈ ⎦. 
Figure 10 depicts  1() K γ  and 
1
()
P C K γ  when  RP α α < . In this case we have   for 







γγ ⎡ ⎞ ∈ ⎟ ⎢ ⎣ ⎠
 and  { }
1
1() , ()
P C KM i n K K γ γ ≤ . 




2 C  type equilibria 






P q γ =  and  0 ISO Π ≥  if and only if 













Note that in the region where  { }
1
2() , ()
R C KM a x K K γ γ >  we have  0 ISO Π < . 






R q γ =  and  0 ISO Π ≥  if and only if 
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B2. Profits of the Public Firm 
Profits of the public generator are also of concern if it faces a break-even constraint. In 
this section we analyze the profits of the public generator under different types of 
equilibrium. The profits of the public generator is given by 
  3 () RR Qq R α λ Π= − −  
 
Unconstrained equilibria 
Note that   if and only if the marginal profit  0 R Π≥ 3 ( RR M ) 0 Q α λ Π ≡− − ≥ . Recall that in 
an unconstrained equilibrium all TCR prices are zero. In   type equilibrium the 
marginal profit is given by 
1
R U
  39 










Recall that   type equilibrium exists for 
1
R U [ ] 0, γ γ ∈ , and from Equation (12) it can be 
easily checked that 
3
4
γ < , implying that the denominator in Equation (45) is always 
positive. Hence the sign of   is identical to the sign of the numerator in Equation 
(B1), which is also positive for 
R MΠ
0, γ γ ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎣ ⎦ . Since this is the relevant range for   type 
equilibrium,   and thus the profits of the public generator are always nonnegative in 







R U  type equilibrium exists only for γ γ ≥ . In the region  , γ γγ ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎣ ⎦, the marginal profit 
for the public generator is 
 










Recall from Section 3.1 that 
2
3
γ <  so the denominator of 
2
R U
R MΠ , and hence the profit 




γγ ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦




γ γ ⎡⎤ ∈⎢ ⎣⎥ ⎦
P
. For the 
case  R α α < , we have 
1
2
γ > , the numerator of 
2
R U
R MΠ , and hence the profits of the 
public generator are negative for  , γ γγ ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎣ ⎦, i.e., the whole region where   type 
equilibrium exists in this case. 
2
R U
Note also that in   type equilibrium, in the region where 
2
R U [ ] ,1 γ γ ∈ , the public 
generator produces  , which results in zero price for the electricity sold. Hence the 
profits of the public generator are strictly negative in this region (except when 
a
0 R α = ). 
 
Constrained equilibria 
1 C  type equilibria 
 
Using Equations (24), (25) and (26), we express the marginal profit for the public 
























R MΠ  is positive if 
 























Π < . Figure 11 shows that 














Π >  for all K , and hence the profits 
































, the profits are negative for all K . 
For the case of   type equilibrium, using Equations (29), (30) and (31), we express 


























R MΠ  is positive if 
 























Π > . Figure 11 shows that 














Π >  for all  , and hence the 




























γ ⎛⎤ ∈⎜ ⎥ ⎝⎦
, the profits are positive for all K . 
 
2 C  type equilibria 
 
Using Equations (34), (35) and (36), we write the marginal profit for the public 
generator in   type equilibrium as 
2
R C
  . (49) 
2
3( 3 1 )
R C
RR MK γα γ Π= − −








R MΠ  is positive if 
                                                           
































Π < . Figure 12 shows that in 
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⎤




Π >  for all  , and hence the profits of the 
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⎤








Π > . 
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